Some opposing definitions in the American political lexicon:
Source of Human Rights
Right: The Creator
Left: Basically good (therefore society primarily responsible for evil)
Right: Not basically good (therefore the individual primarily responsible for evil)
“CONFORTARE ESTO VIR” significa “sê corajoso, porta-te como homem (1Rs 2,2).”
Bertrand Russell, membro da Escola de Frankfurt, é autor de uma observação que vale ser citada aqui, para que se saiba desde o início o que é que enfrentamos: “Usando técnicas psicológicas para ensinar às crianças, seremos capazes de produzir a convicção de que a neve é preta!”
“Usando técnicas psicológicas para ensinar às crianças, seremos capazes de produzir a convicção de que a neve é preta!”
Faz-se necessário salientar (de forma muito breve e superficial) que a Escola de Frankfurt foi um mecanismo criado por marxistas para a realização de pesquisas na área da psicologia, com vistas a melhor aplicar o marxismo na cultura e, então, facilitar a destruição dessa mesma cultura desde o seu núcleo, sem que os cidadãos se apercebessem do processo. Continue lendo “CONFORTARE ESTO VIR”
In his magnificent book, Law and Public Opinion, A. V. Dicey distinguished between the trend of legislation on the one hand and the trend of opinion on the other. Legislation, he argued, is dominated by the underlying current of opinion, but only after a considerable lag. Men legislate on the basis of the philosophy they imbibed in their youth, so some twenty years or more may elapse between a change in the underlying current of opinion and the resultant alteration in public policy. Dicey sets 1870 to 1890 as the period in which public opinion in England turned away from individualism (Manchester liberalism) and toward collectivism; yet he points out that economic legislation was not strongly affected by the new trend of opinion until after the turn of the century.
The common belief that it is impossible (or, if not impossible, then so unpromising as to be not worth while attempting) to elicit explanatory general principles from what is recognized to be conservative conduct is not one that I share. It may be true that conservative conduct does not readily provoke articulation in the idiom of general idea, and that consequently there has been a certain reluctance to undertake this kind of elucidation; but it is not to be presumed that conservative conduct is less eligible than any other for this sort of interpretation, for what it is worth. Nevertheless, this is not the enterprise I propose to engage in here. My theme is not a creed or a doctrine, but a disposition. To be conservative is to be disposed to think and behave in certain manners; it is to prefer certain kinds of conduct and certain conditions of human circumstances to others; it is to be disposed to make certain kinds of choices. And my design here is to construe this disposition as it appears in contemporary character, rather than to transpose it into the idiom of general principles.